



Navigating Post-GST1 in the Region: Opportunities for Multilateralism in the NDC-Updating Processes

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GST1 highlights multilateralism as one of the drivers for international cooperation, particularly in building partnerships among governments and non-Party stakeholders to address the interconnected issues of climate change and development relevant to the countries and regions.

Regional Stocktaking. *By contextualizing the outcomes of the GST1 within the regions, Parties and non-Party stakeholders in the region can be informed towards more evidence-based and needs-based solutions aimed at climate-resilient development. Regional stocktaking is a strategic action in support of the need to assess global collective progress in achieving Paris Agreement goals, particularly of the forward-looking aspects with lessons from the national and sub-national levels, as well as the shared experiences within the region at the core of the political and technical assessments. The Regional Climate Centers and Climate Weeks are in the best position to provide the space for technical and political discussions.*

Technical Assessment and Reference to the Best Available Science. *Roundtable discussions have improved from the inception to the third and final session, living up to the essence of ‘learning by doing.’ However, these discussions must be based on the IPCC assessments. By leveraging the best available science in the region, Parties and relevant stakeholders are in the best position to identify where immediate action is needed and to develop long-term strategies for reducing emissions and building climate resilience. The technical assessments including the submissions should be pivotal in determining signals and indicators to support countries in updating their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC).*

Non-Party stakeholders as active partners. *The decision must not end at acknowledging non-Party stakeholders, but ensure that the enabling environment for collaboration is present and not an afterthought. Non-Party stakeholders were invited to several dialogues despite the short notice announcements and were able to deliver perspectives from the regions and sectors being represented. Underscoring the active engagement with non-Party stakeholders, such as civil society organizations and the private sector, in driving climate action in regions has demonstrated the successful implementation of climate action policies and initiatives.*

A Case of the Southeast Asia Region

After the conclusion of the first Global Stocktake (GST1) in COP28, the period leading up to the updating of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) by 2025 presents a critical opportunity for enhanced ambition and urgent climate action. This policy brief reflects on the outcomes of the GST1 in consideration of the diverse adaptation and mitigation strategies of countries in Southeast Asia. This brief offers a regional perspective in the context of the outcomes, drawing insights from the [ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change to COP28](#), the ASEAN Climate Change Report, and the [policy recommendations by the Independent Global Stocktake Southeast Asia Hub submitted to the GST](#) amongst others.

Adaptation¹

Parties are urged to submit their national adaptation plan (NAP) by 2025 and guidance on adaptation communications will be reviewed in the same year. The decision underscores the importance of the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA) under the Glasgow-Sharm el-Sheik work program. However, it falls short in providing concrete indicators and target setting to address adaptation needs. The decision highlights further that multi-sector approaches may offer economic, social, and environmental benefits such as improved resilience and well-being, and that adaptation can contribute to mitigating impacts and losses, as part of a country-driven gender-responsive and participatory approach, building on the best available science as well as Indigenous Peoples' knowledge and local knowledge systems.

What it means for Southeast Asia

- **GGA & NAP implementation:** Need for further review of Southeast Asian countries' national adaptation plans and adaptation communications to identify gaps in implementation and the need for implementation support²;
- **Multi-sector solutions:**
 - Strengthening ASEAN's disaster response through existing mechanisms such as the ASEAN Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response (AADMER), ASEAN Declaration on One ASEAN, One Response, integrating Climate Change Adaptation (CCA) and Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in AADMER's 2021-2025 Work Programme, and enhancing the Southeast Asia Disaster Risk Insurance Facility (SEADRIF);
 - Leveraging co-benefits of adaptation and disaster risk reduction to address climate impacts and residual risks, including ecosystem-based solutions and indigenous knowledge;
 - Promoting multi-sector strategies such as climate-smart agriculture, urban development, and adaptive built environment in food systems and cities across the Southeast Asian region.

Mitigation³

Snapshot of data-driven energy transition in the region⁴

- *Southeast Asia faces rapid energy demand growth, projected to rise by 60% in the next 20 years. Several barriers that hinder the acceleration of the renewable energy transition include inconsistent planning, outdated grid infrastructure, under-investment of power grid infrastructure, and limited collaboration among stakeholders.*
- *In 2021, coal dominated Indonesia's power sector with over 60% and the Philippines similarly relies on coal for nearly 60% of power generation. Thailand's power mix is led by natural gas (54%), with increasing contributions from renewables. Vietnam boasts the region's highest wind and solar share, almost 12%.*
- *Widespread adoption of electric mobility in ASEAN countries has the potential to cut down on total energy use. However, significant reductions in primary energy demand would require the implementation of electric vehicles paired with a strong policy shift for cleaner electricity generation.⁵*

1 Aligned with paragraphs 45, 46, 48, 49, 55, 63, 64 of UNFCCC/PA/CMA.5/2023

2 An example of this recommendation is a policy report by ICSC. Lukban, D., Supnet, D. (2023). Overview of the Climate Policy Progress in Southeast Asia: Taking Stock of the Countries' Submissions to the UNFCCC. <https://icsc.ngo/portfolio-items/southeast-asia-stocktake-report-2023/>

3 Aligned with paragraphs 28, 33, 34 of UNFCCC/PA/CMA.5/2023

4 Southeast Asia Information Platform for the Energy Transition. (2024). <https://www.sipet.org/>

5 Chang, Y., Li, Y. (2019). Electric Vehicles and Energy Insecurity in ASEAN Countries: Renewable Energy Integration and Urban Air Quality. <https://www.adb.org/publications/electric-vehicles-energy-insecurity-asean-countries>

One significant achievement of the GST1 is the decision to “transition away from fossil fuels,” marking the first time that fossil fuels were addressed in a COP decision. Another key outcome is the triple renewable and double energy efficiency by 2030. The decision also highlights the need for pathways and approaches to enhance efforts in halting and reversing deforestation and forest degradation by 2030, along with protecting other terrestrial and marine ecosystems as greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs, conserving biodiversity, and ensuring social and environmental safeguards.

What it means for Southeast Asia

- **Energy:** Reaffirm commitment to achieving progress in clean, renewable energy (RE) and energy efficiency, aiming for a 32% energy intensity reduction in ASEAN’s energy mix under the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation (APAEC);
- **Biodiversity, Forestry, and Land Use:** Reaffirm commitment to sustainable forest management and social forestry development, including implementing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) decisions on REDD+ and enhancing biodiversity conservation across various ecosystems including terrestrial, coastal, marine, and mangrove ecosystems, as stated in the ASEAN Joint Statement on COP28;
- **Transport:** Enhance connectivity and create common markets to boost regional economies and aid in decarbonization by leveraging the existing national partnerships in ASEAN, such as the Fuel Economy Roadmap for light-duty vehicles.⁶

Means of Implementation and Support⁷

State of means of implementation and support in the region⁸

- *The ASEAN Joint Statement on COP28 highlights the critical role of fulfilling means of implementation committed by developed Parties to the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement on finance, technology development and transfer, and capacity building in response to support the diverse needs of ASEAN Member States and other developing countries.*
- *In 2021, most ASEAN countries are in the early stages of assessing technology needs for climate change adaptation, relying on various technologies in strategy development. These include climate-smart agriculture, water balance systems, hazard early warning systems, and disease surveillance.*
- *However, documentation often fails to identify the extent of technological development, adoption levels, and sources despite increasing regional cooperation such as the Committee on Science and Technology and the Plan of Action on Science, Technology, and Innovation (PASTI) 2016–2025.*

Climate Finance. The reaffirmed decision underscores the critical need for scaled-up finance from developed countries and multilateral development banks, emphasizing the importance of reforming the international finance architecture. It draws attention to provisions by which developed countries should address the failures in meeting the \$100 billion climate finance goal. Significant climate finance negotiations are expected by 2024 for Parties to decide on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). Notable actions include the strong call for doubling adaptation finance and operationalizing the Loss and Damage Fund, hoping to address the widening gap of adaptation finance.

Technology Development and Transfer. The decision highlights the crucial contribution of non-Party stakeholders, particularly the private sector, in advancing climate technology innovation and deployment, which is key to addressing disparities in technology adoption. It also notes the artificial intelligence’s potential to scale up transformative climate solutions for adaptation and mitigation, especially in developing countries.

6 Council for Decarbonising Transport in Asia. (2022). The Path to Zero: A Vision for Decarbonised Transport in Asia. https://changing-transport.org/wp-content/uploads/202204_NDC-TIA-Council_The-Path-to-Zero.pdf

7 Aligned with paragraphs 67, 68, 69, 73, 75, 81 103, 106, 107, 109, 113, 114, 115, 116 of UNFCCC/PA/CMA.5/2023

8 The ASEAN Secretariat. (2021). ASEAN Climate Change Report. https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/ASCCR-e-publication-Correction_8-June.pdf

Capacity building. The decision recognizes the best practices in capacity-building, notably multi-stakeholder engagement, local ownership in beneficiary countries, and sharing of lessons learned, including from community and indigenous knowledge and practices, particularly at the regional level.

What it means for Southeast Asia

- **Climate Finance:**
 - Stronger advocacy for debt management and cancellation and promote grant-based financial mechanisms;
 - ASEAN urges the Board of the Green Climate Fund to streamline guidelines for supporting adaptation activities, simplify approval and disbursement processes, and enhance direct fund access for developing country Parties;
 - Measure the impacts of climate finance on communities and uphold accountability. Developed nations doing their fair share and delivering their financial obligations is a top priority; multilateral climate funds should not be

held back by a lack of funding. Ensuring that these contributions can be accessed effectively and efficiently by those who need them most.

- **Technology:** Promote the advancement of low-emission technologies, unlock opportunities, and facilitate cross-border flows of clean and renewable energy to enable a just and inclusive energy transition.
- **Capacity-building:**
 - Recognize the significance of human rights, gender equality, and the involvement of youth, the private sector, vulnerable groups, local communities, and indigenous peoples in addressing climate change, highlighting the value of indigenous knowledge and traditional practices in fostering community climate resilience;
 - ASEAN highlights the support to the Capacity Building Initiative for Transparency (CBIT) by ensuring sufficient and enduring funding to aid developing country Parties in establishing or improving their national transparency frameworks.

Loss and Damage¹¹

The formal establishment of the Loss and Damage Fund marked a historic moment for the world's most vulnerable countries, but concerns persist about its future financing and sustainability. The decision also recognizes national efforts to address loss and damage from climate impacts and calls for improved coherence on disaster risk reduction, humanitarian aid, and climate adaptation initiatives to effectively mitigate climate-related losses and damages. However, it falls short of identifying clear response measures to address the impacts of loss and damage to countries.

What it means for Southeast Asia

- Provide sustainable support to the ASEAN Member States in developing their plans for adaptation and addressing loss and damage, in alignment with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030;

Tracking the region's climate finance flows

According to OECD-DAC (2010-2022)⁹, the estimated committed funds for adaptation and mitigation in Southeast Asia are \$21.7 billion and \$25.7 billion respectively. The pledges for adaptation were approximately disbursed at 45% with \$9.7 billion and mitigation with 53% at \$13.7 billion.

Southeast Asian countries representation in major climate finance mechanisms:

- *Green Climate Fund: Philippines (alternate board member)*
- *Global Environment Facility:*
 - *Cambodia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Thailand, Viet Nam (Constituency Member); Vietnam (Council Member), Cambodia (Alternate)*
 - *Indonesia, Philippines, Timor Leste (Constituency Member); Timor Leste (Alternate)*
- *Global Shield Against Climate Risks: Philippines (Board Member)*
- *Loss and Damage Fund: The Philippine representative nominated to the Loss and Damage Fund Board as part of the Asia-Pacific States Constituency.¹⁰*

⁹ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee. (2022). <https://stats.oecd.org/>

¹⁰ UNFCCC (n.d.). Members nominated to the Loss and Damage fund Board. *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change*. <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/bodies/funds-and-financial-entities/loss-and-damage-fund-joint-interim-secretariat/members-nominated-to-the-loss-and-damage-fund-board>
PCO (2023, December 14). "PBBM: PH secures a seat in inaugural 'Loss and Damage Fund Board'". *Presidential Communications Office*. https://pco.gov.ph/news_releases/pbbm-ph-secures-a-seat-in-inaugural-loss-and-damage-fund-board/

¹¹ Aligned with paragraphs 125, 131 of UNFCCC/PA/CMA.5/2023.

- The need for data and information gathering and analysis on loss and damage at the local level in support of attributions on climate-induced loss and damage. Country and local assessments integral to their risk management strategies can help countries develop their cases to facilitate access to funds supporting loss and damage.¹²

Response Measures¹³

The decision acknowledges efforts to assess and address the socioeconomic impacts of response measures urging Parties to share national case studies, establish partnerships, and pursue sustainable development diversification policies. The decision also urges the development of methodologies, in consultation with technical experts, that minimize the negative impacts of climate change and focus on the creation of decent work and economic diversification.

What it means for Southeast Asia

- Opportunities to engage IPCC experts from the Southeast Asian region to integrate and mainstream findings of the Sixth Assessment Report (AR6) into regional and national contexts;
- Support Southeast Asian IPCC experts' call for research ownership and utilization of locally developed science and evidence;¹⁴
- Implement downscaling of climate model pathways for improved regional and local relevance and applicability.

International Cooperation¹⁵

The decision welcomes international cooperative efforts by both Parties and non-Party stakeholders in enhancing climate action and sharing resources. The decision also acknowledges the leadership of high-level champions in facilitating the participation of non-Party stakeholders in the Global Stocktake and urges collective efforts to accelerate inclusive, multi-level, and gender-responsive action.

What it means for Southeast Asia

- The ASEAN reaffirms its commitment to enhancing climate action and cooperation in ASEAN through the ASEAN Working Group on Climate Change (AWGCC) Action Plan, aligned with global climate change agendas;
- Further, reaffirms its commitment to welcoming the development of an ASEAN Community-Based Climate Action to overview regional climate initiatives at the community level;
- Opportunities in non-Party stakeholders' engagements, the integration of science into policy-making, promoting low GHG emissions and green and climate-resilient development. Non-Party stakeholders can contribute to the GST in multiple ways, including but not limited to directly engaging with governments, putting pressure on policymakers to push for policies and strategies supported with concrete evidence and research, and promoting climate action initiatives and campaigns on the ground.

The first Global Stocktake underscores a pivotal window leading up to the 2025 NDC update where increased ambition and accelerated climate action are essential. Southeast Asia's distinct adaptation and mitigation challenges, as reflected in the outcomes of the GST1, stress the importance of multilateral cooperation and the engagement of non-Party stakeholders. The pressing demand to enhance the adaptive capacities of Southeast Asian countries in disaster risk response and address the multitude of incurred losses and damage reflects the region's dynamic needs. Priorities in the region must also be given to sustainable and clean energy transition, biodiversity conservation, and robust support to implementation mechanisms. Regional cooperation, embodied in ASEAN's united front, serves not only as a catalyst for transformative solutions but also signals a collective commitment to addressing growing climate challenges in alignment with the Paris Agreement goals.

¹² UNEP - GAN. (2023, November 28). *United Nations Environment Programme - Global Adaptation Network*. <https://wedocs.unep.org/handle/20.500.11822/44225>

¹³ Aligned with paragraphs 138, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147 of UNFCCC/PA/CMA.5/2023

¹⁴ ICSC (2022, May 25). "Regional Dimensions and Priorities on Loss and Damage". *Climate-resilient ASEAN a win for economic development-local scientists*".

¹⁵ Aligned with paragraphs 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163 of UNFCCC/PA/CMA.5/2023